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Comments
FEDmiAL COumTs-JmIES-EXCLSION OF WoXMN.-Plaintiff instituted
a medical malpractice action against two physicians in the Federal
District Court for the Western District of Kentucky. The action re-
lated to a cancer which affected the plaintiffs penis, groin, and
other parts of his body. The district judge without inquiry determined
that the proceedings would be distasteful to women and excluded all
women from the petit jury panel. The all-male jury found for the
physicians and plaintiff appealed. Held: Reversed. The exclusion of
women as a class from a federal jury violates the fundamental rule
that federal juries must derive from a fair and broadly based cross-
section of the community.' Abbott v. Mines, 411 F.2d 353 (6th Cir.
1969).
At common law, the right to jury trial meant a jury composed ex-
clusively of males.2 Preserving the common law theory, the Federal
Constitution provided for trial by jury of all crimes tried in the federal
courts.3 Since the common law jury was confined to males, it has been
said that to the framers of the Constitution, a jury meant a body of
twelve men duly impaneled as triers of fact.4
Gradually, beginning in the territory of Wyoming in 1870, women
were allowed to serve as jurors in the United States,5 but there was
' The Court also said that the issue of actual prejudice to the plaintiff need
not be decided. 411 F.2d at 355.
23 W. BLAcKsToNm, Co imNTAruams 362 (6th Ed. 1774). Women did not
have the right to serve on juries because of the doctrine of propter defectum
sexus (because not of the male sex). There was one exception to the general
rule-when a woman before the court claimed to be pregnant and presented an
issue of fact as to: (1) whether there was an heir to an estate in question; or
(2) whether a woman under sentence of death should be granted a stay of
execution until birth of her child. In either case, juries of matrons were impaneled
to decide the issue. Id.
3 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
4 See, e.g., Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930); Capital Traction
Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1 (1899); Diederich v. American News Co., 128 F.2d 144
(10th Cir. 1942).
5 Wyoming based the granting of the right to serve as jurors on an 1869
statute giving women the right to vote. See Fisher, Women as Jurors: The
Present Status of Women as to Jury Service, 33 A.B.A.J. 113 (1947). Washington
was the second territory to permit women to serve as jurors when a code
provision qualifying all electors as grand jurors was construed to include women
who were qualified electors. Rosencrantz v. Territory, 2 Wash. Terr. 267, 5 P.
805 (1884). In 1898, Utah became the first state to permit women to serve asjurors, again as an incidence of the right to vote. See UTAn CoDE ANN. § § 78-46-
8, 78-46-17 (1953).
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also a substantial trend of judicial denial.6 With the passage of the
nineteenth amendment in 1920, some states automatically made
women eligible to serve as jurors by virtue of state laws providing
that all legal voters were qualified to be jurors.7 Some states, however,
held that jury service was a duty required of eligible voters and not a
necessary incident of the right of suffrage, nor a privilege granted to
all citizens under the Constitution.8 State statutes enacted after
women's suffrage took three general approaches to the right of women
to serve as state jurors: (1) women were qualified to serve as jurors
on the same basis as men;9 (2) women were neither barred nor com-
pelled to serve as jurors;' 0 or (8) women were denied the right to
serve as jurors."
Those states denying women the right to serve as jurors, and also
those permitting certain exceptions for women, did so under the
fourteenth amendment.1 2 It was continually held that an automatic
OE.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879)(dictum):
We do not say that ... a state may not prescribe the qualifications of
its jurors, and in so doing make discriminations. It may confine the selection
to males, to freeholders, to citizens, to persons within certain ages, or to
persons having educational qualifications. We do not believe the four-
teenth amendment was ever intended to prohibit this. Looking at its
history, it is clear it had no such purpose; its aim was against discrimina-
tion because of race or color.
In 1892, the Supreme Court of Wyoming held that the right to vote granted to
women did "not include the right, if right it may be termed, to serve as a juror."
McKinney v. State, 3 Wyo. 719, 724, 30 P. 293, 295 (1892).7 E.g., Palmer v. State, 197 Ind. 625, 150 N.W. 917 (1926); State v. Walker,
192 Iowa 823, 185 N.W. 619 (1921); Thatcher v. Pennsylvania, 0 & Del. R.R.,
33 Ohio App. 242, 168 N.E. 859 (1928); Commonwealth v. Maxwell, 271 Pa.
378, 114 A. 825 (1921). See generally Crozier, Constitutionality of Discrimination
Based on Sex, 15 B.U. L. 11Ev. 722 (1935); Rudolph, Women on Juries-
Voluntary or Compulsory? J. Ams. Ju. Soc'y 206 (1961); 51 MINN. L. REv.
552 (1967).8 E.g., People v. Lensen, 34 Cal. App. 336, 167 P. 406 (1917); People v.
Barltz, 212 Mich. 580, 180 N.W. 423 (1920). See McKinney v. State, 3 Wyo.
719, 30 P. 293 (1892).
9 This was a direct incident of the right of women to vote. See note 7
supra, and accompanying text. See generally Note, Jury Service for Women, 12
FLA. L. 1Ev. 224 (1959).
10 These statutes may be divided into three categories: (1) those excusing
women on whom jury duty may place an undue hardship because of family
responsibilities; (2) those giving women an absolute exemption based solely on
sex, but requiring the exemption be affirmatively applied for; and (3) those
giving women an absolute exemption, and requiring them to volunteer if they
wish to be considered for jury duty. Note, Courts-Women Jurors-Automatic
Exemption, 36 TUL. L. Rzv. 858, 860 (1962). For a listing of various state
exemptions for women see 12 FLA. L. REv., supra note 9, at 231. See also
Rudolph, supra note 7.
11 States denying women the right to serve did so on the basis that the
denial was a reasonable classification under the fourteenth amendment. See note
12 infra. and accompanying text. See also note 17 infra, and accompanying text.12 The fourteenth amendment recognizes the power of the state to classify
its citizens, requiring only that such classification not be arbitrary and that all
(Continued on next page)
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exclusion or exception based upon sex was a reasonable classification
under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 13 Yet
the United States Supreme Court repeatedly held that certain "un-
reasonable" state classifications, such as those based on race, denied
equal protection. 14 In 1966, however, a three-judge federal court in
White v. Crook15 held that Alabama's law denying women the right
to serve as state jurors was a denial of equal protection.16 Today no
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
Sersons within a class be treated equally. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357
1927); Lindsey v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911); Louisville
& N. R.R. Co. v. Melton, 218 U.S. 36 (1910).
Unlike the due process clause, which is called into operation only when
a person is deprived of life, liberty, or property,' the equal protection
clause is an omnipresent prohibition of all arbitrary classification. It is an
absolute command to the state to accord equal treatment to its citizens
unless it has a reasonable basis for differentiation.
Note, Sex, Discrimination, and the Constitution, 2 STAN. L. BEiV. 691, 725
(1950).
13 E.g., Bacom v. State, 39 So.2d 794 (Fla. 1949); Hall v. State, 134 Fla.
644, 187 So. 392 (1939); State v. Hall,-Miss.-, 187 So.2d 861 (1966). In
Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948), the Court decided that because women
are "still regarded as the center of the home and family life," a state may
properly decide that excusing them from jury duty serves the general welfare.
Id. at 466.
Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) involved a Florida statute that made
women automatically exempt from jury duty, requiring them to volunteer if they
wished to be considered for service. The evidence showed that ten persons out of
100,000 on the county jury lists were women and that less than five per cent of
the women volunteers were placed on the list. These statistics were deemed in-
sufficient to show that the statute was being applied in a discriminatory manner
and the exemption for women was held valid.
It has been argued that state statutes granting automatic exemptions to
women in effect automatically exclude women. See, e.g., 36 TUL. L. REv., supra
note 10, at 861.
14 Though the Supreme Court had intimated in Strauder v. West Virginia,
100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879) that women could be excluded from state juries, a
long line of cases thereafter held that it was a violation of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment for a state to discriminate against Negroes
when selecting jurors. E.g., Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958); Patton
v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947); Smith v. Texas. 311 U.S. 128 (1940); Norris
v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U.S. 226 (1904);
Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880).
In Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954), the equal protection clause
was held applicable to discrimination in jury service based on nationality.
Recent interpretations of the equal protection clause hold that other un-
reasonable state classifications, besides race, are also prohibited. E.g., Harper v.
Virginia, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (requirement of payment of poll tax to qualify to
vote); Carrington v. Rash. 380 U.S. 89 (1965) (preventing members of the armed
services from voting); McLaughlin v. Florida. 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (prohibiting
unmarried interracial counle from habihiallv living together).
15 251 F. Supp. 401 (M.D. Ala. 1966).
16 The White case was the first decision to declare a state statute uncon-
situtional that totally excluded women from jury duty. It involved a class asking
relief for exclusion from juries in an Alabama county and the United States
intervened as a plaintiff. In holding the Alabama statute unconstitutional, the
Court said:
The argument that the Fourteenth Amendment was not historically in-
tended to require the states to make women eligible for jury service
(Continued on next page)
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state denies women the right to serve as jurors in the state courts.17
Federal jury procedure was a matter of uncertainty following
women's suffrage. In order to be competent to serve as a juror in a
federal district court, one had to be qualified to serve as a juror in
the state in which the federal court was sitting. This presented many
different interpretations of what constituted a "federal juror." 8 This
was the situation in 1946, when the United States Supreme Court held
in Ballard v. United States 9 that the "purposeful and systematic ex-
clusion" of women from a federal jury panel was contrary to the
scheme of jury selection adopted by Congress.20 The Court based the
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
reflects a misconception of the function of the Constitution and this
Court's obligation in interpreting it. The Constitution of the United
States must be read as embodying general principles meant to govern
society and the institutions of government, a responsibility and a right
that should be shared by all citizens, regardless of sex. The Alabama
statute that denies women the right to serve on juries in the State of
Alabama therefore violates thatprovision of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States that forbids any state to 'deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of he laws.' The
plain effect of this constitutional provision is to prohibit prejudicial
disparities before the law. This means prejudicial disparities for all
citizens-including women. Id. at 408.
For information on the present status of state statutes excluding women fromjury services, see note 17 infra.
17 As recently as 1966, three states, Alabama, Mississippi, and South
Carolina, continued to exclude women from state juries within their borders.
After the decision in White v. Crook, 251 F. Supp. 401 (M.D. Ala. 1966), which
held Alabama's statute unconstitutional, all three states amended their statutes
within the next two years to provide for service by eligible citizens. ALA. CODE
tit. 30 § 21 (Supp. 1968); Miss. CODE ANN. § 1762 (Supp. 1968); S.C. CODE §
38-52 (Supp. 1968). See also Taylor v. State, 282 Ala. 673. 213 So. 2d 836
(1968); State v. Richburg, 250 S. C. 451, 158 S.E.2d 769 (1968).
8 See note 9-11 su pra, and accompanying text. As to all jury procedure
questions, the federal courts were bound by the law of the state in which they
sat. Uniform qualifications for federal jurors were not enacted until 1948. See
note 23 infra.
19 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
20 Ballard involved a state, California. which by statute allowed women to
serve as jurors on the same basis as men. Thus the Court decided that the system
of jury selection that Congress had adopted in California, i.e. as declared by the
law of that state, contemplated federal juries representative of both sexes. Id.
See note 18 supra.
Ballard relied heavily on Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 828 U.S. 217 (1946),
which held that a federal jury panel, from which persons who worked for a
daily wage were intentionally and systematically excluded, was unlawfully con-
stituted. 329 U.S. at 192-93. In commenting on the exclusion of women from the
federal court jury, the Court said:
The truth is that the two sexes are not fungible; a community made up
exclusively of one is different from a community composed of both; the
subtle interplay of influence one on the other is among the imponderables.
To insulate the courtroom from either may in a given case make not an
iota of difference. Yet a flavor, a distinct quality is lost if either sex is
excluded. The exclusion of one may indeed make the jury less repre-
sentative of the community than would be true if an economic or racial
group were excluded.
Id. at 193-94. See also Rudolph, supra note 7.
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decision on its power of supervision over the administration of justice
in the federal courts.2 1 While ostensibly the decision in Ballard ap-
peared to be one extensive in scope, it extended only to those states
which allowed women to serve as jurors. 22
With the enactment of the Judicial Code of 1948, Congress adopted
uniform qualifications for jurors in the federal courts.2 3 Out of de-
ference to the states, however, and in an effort to avoid controversy,
Congress chose to disqualify for federal jury services all persons who
were incompetent to serve on juries in the state in which the federal
district court was sitting.2 4 The Civil Rights Act of 1957,25 however,
finally enacted uniform federal juror qualifications independent of
those prescribed by the states. 26 Thus women became eligible for
federal juror service on the same basis as men in all states.2 7
21 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943). See Thiel v. Southern
Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946).22 As mentioned, Ballard was specifically dealing with a state which by
statute allowed women to serve as jurors, thus this was the applicable "federal
law" in the case. See notes 18 and 20 supra, and accompanying text. One year
later, the Court in Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947) said:
We may insist on their [women] inclusion on federal juries where by
state law they are eligible but woman jury service has not so become a
part of the textual or customary law of the land that one convicted of
crime must be set free by this Court if his state has lagged behind
what we personally may regard as the most desirable practice in
recognizing the rights and obligations of womanhood. 332 U.S. at 290.
Thus, while the Ballard decision extolled the concept of the "fungible"
nature of the sexes on the one hand, the Fay decision implied that if a state
statute forbidding women to serve as jurors were before the Court as a federaljury question, the statute would be valid as the law of the state in which the
federal district court sat. Id. See quotation at note 20 supra.
23 Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1861, 62 Stat. 951. This act set the
minimum qualifications for federal jurors as a citizen of twenty-one years of age
and a resident of the judicial district. The enactment became Title 28 of the
United States Code, "Judiciary and Judicial Procedure," and it remains codified
there in amended form today. 28 U.S.C. § § 1861-69 (Supp. IV, 1968). See note
28 infra, and accompanying text.2 4 Section 1861(4) of the Judicial Code of 1948 provided that a person was
incompetent to serve as a federal juror if:(4) He is incompetent to serve as a grand or petit juror by the law of
the state in which the district court is held.
Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1861, 62 Stat. 951. See Rabinowitz v. United
States, 366 F.2d 34, 45-51 (5th Cir. 1966) for an excellent history of federaljury procedure until 1966.
25 Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, § 152, 71 Stat. 638, as
amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (Supp. IV, 1968).26 In the Civil Rights Act of 1957, section 1861(4), as established by the
Judicial Code of 1948, was deleted. Thus federal juror qualifications were finally
truly independent of state iuror statutes. Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No.
85-315, § 152, 71 Stat. 638, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § § 1861-62 (Supp. IV,
1968).
27 No longer were the federal courts burdened with the uncomfortable pos-
sibility of overruling the exclusion of women as federal jurors in one case and
upholding it in another. Compare Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187(1946) with Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947) [and] Hoyt v. Florida, 368
U.S. 57 (1961). See also note 23 supra.
(Cortinued on next page)
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The most recent statutory pronouncement states that all federal
litigants entitled to trial by jury have the right to juries "selected at
random from a fair cross-section of the community" and that no
citizen shall be excluded from service as a federal juror on account of
sex.28 The proceedings in the Abbott case, however, were instituted
before the enactment of this law.
The court in Abbott, following a group of federal jury procedure
cases,2 9 decided that "[tihe American tradition of trial by jury,
considered in connection with either criminal or civil proceedings,
necessarily contemplates an impartial jury drawn from a cross-section
of the community."30 Citing Ballard and the Civil Rights Act of 1957,
the court rejected the claim of the appellee-physicians that federal law
vests discretionary powers in district judges such that the exclusion of
women was allowable.31
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
The Judicial Code of 1948, however, also contained an additional section
relevant to the problem of group exclusion from federal juries:
§ 1863. ExcLusION OR EXCUSE FROM SERVICE.
(a) A district judge for good cause may excuse or exclude from jury
service any person called as a juror.
(b) Any class or group of persons may, for the public interest, be ex-
cluded from the jury anel or excused from service as jurors by
order of the district judge based on a finding that such jury service
would entail undue hardship, extreme inconvenience or serious ob-
struction or delay in the fair and impartial administration of justice.
Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646 § 1863, 62 Stat. 951, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § §
1861-62 (Supp. IV, 1968).2 S Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. § § 1861-69 (Supp. IV,
1968). The relevant provisions substituted into Title 28 are:
§ 1861. DECLARATION OF POLICY.
It is the policy of the United States that all litigants in Federal courts
entitled to trial by jury shall have the right to grand and petit juries
selected at random from a fair cross-section of the community in the
district or division wherein the court convenes. It is further the policy of
the United States that all citizens shall have the opportunity to be
considered for service....
§ 1862. DISCRIMINATION PROHIBITED.
No citizen shall be excluded from service as a grand or petit juror in the
district courts of the United States on account of race, color, religion,
sex, national origin, or economic status. (Emphasis added).
Implicit in the statute is the notion that the procedure at voir dire remains un-
changed. The statute leaves undisturbed the right of a litigant to exercise per-
emptory challenges to eliminate jurors for purely subjective reasons. See 2
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM. NEws 1795 (1968).
29 Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946); Thiel v. Southern
Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
30Abbott v. Mines, 411 F.2d 353, 354 (6th Cir. 1969). The Court is
quoting from Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1947).
31411 F.2d at 354-55. (It should be noted that the opinion incorrectly cites
the Civil Rights Act of 1957 as the Civil Rights Act of 1947). The appellees
claimed that section 1863 of the Judicial Code allowed the district judge to,
within his discretion, exclude well-defined community groups, namely women,
from service as federal jurors. Id. at 355. See note 27 supra, for the applicable
provisions of section 1863.
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Although Federal District Judges clearly have discretion in parti-
cular cases to regulate the composition of juries, that discretion
is and must be strongly circumscribed by the fundamental rule
that federal juries must derive from a fair and broadly based
cross-section of the community.3 2
The court conceded that the district judge could have properly
excused any of the prospective women jurors in the instant case if
they had requested to be excused because the proceedings would be
distasteful to them.3 3 Noting that women are no longer "coddled" by
society, the court decided that "[a]ny attempt to gain competent jurors
that would result in a less representative cross-section than a selection
drawn from the statutorily qualified pool would destroy the 'right'
to serve on juries that Congress intended to confer."34
The court seems to have rested its decision on its power as a
federal appellate court to supervise and protect the congressional
purpose behind federal jury procedure as provided by law.3 5 The
decision is significant both as to parties deprived of a representative
jury and to women who are excluded from jury service. Implicit in
the concept of appellate supervision, it seems, is the notion of due
process of law, as guaranteed to all federal litigants by the fifth
amendment. It seems equally implicit that due process incorporates
basic notions of equal protection into the fifth amendment.36 This
means first, that appellate supervision of federal jury procedure seems
to protect the constitutional right of a federal litigant to due process.
Secondly, since Congress intended to confer a right to vote on a
statutorily qualified pool, it seems that any attempt to exclude a
member of that pool, namely a woman, would be not only a denial of
due process to the litigant, but also a deprivation of equal protection
to the woman, based on an unreasonable classification. While not
explicitly recognizing these arguments, the court in Abbott did, as
mentioned above, decide that women have a right to serve on juries.
The Court also said:
The District Judge's desire to avoid embarrassment to the
women jurors is understandable and commendable but such
sentiments must be subordinated to constitutional or congressional
mandates. (Emphasis added).37
32 411 F.2d at 355.
33 Id.
34 Id. The Court is quoting from Rabinowitz v. United States, 366 F.2d 34,
55 (5th Cir. 1966).
35 411 F.2d at 355. See note 21 supra, for the concept of the supervisory
powers of the United States Supreme Court.36See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937);
District of Columbia v. Brooke, 214 U.S. 138 (1909). See also 16 Am. Jm. 2D
CousArrunoN.L LAw § § 490, 551 (1964).
37 411 F.2d at 355.
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This language seems to indicate the court's awareness of the consti-
tutional limitations involved when women are denied the right to serve
as jurors-both as to the woman denied the right and to the litigant
before the court.
C. Michael Buxton
CimnAL LAw-BAm-i-lGr TO BAmI iN CA~rrAL CASES AF=E FioR
BEvOCATION.-Appellant was arrested for murder in Clay County, Ken-
tucky, on September 5, 1968, and admitted to $10,000 bail in Clay
Circuit Court on September 8, 1968. Thereafter an indictment for will-
ful murder, a capital crime in Kentucky,' was returned by the Clay
County Grand Jury and the appellant was arraigned. By agreement
between the appellant and the Commonwealth of Kentucky, venue of
the pending prosecution was changed to Knox Circuit Court for the
purpose of trial. In early February, 1969, the Knox Circuit Judge
caused the appellant to appear before him and ordered his bail re-
voked. Appellant then filed a new motion for bail which was over-
ruled after an evidentiary hearing not unfavorable to him. After this
decision the appellant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
which was dismissed. The appellant then appealed this dismissal.
Held: Reversed. Where appellant, charged with willful murder, had
remained on bail of $10,000 set by one judge from September, 1968,
until February, 1969, without indication that he conducted himself
in any manner other than that required by law, he was entitled to bail
from another judge, after change of venue, in a reasonable amount,
but not to exceed the amount previously fixed. Marcum v. Broughton,
442 S.W.2d 307 (Ky. 1969).
There have been very few decisions handed down by the Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals on this aspect of bail; indeed, the broad sub-
ject itself has been treated on relatively few, but significant, oc-
casions. Bail in Kentucky is based upon the State Constitution which
reads in part:
All prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient securities, unless for
capital offenses when the proof is evident or the presumption
great;2 and the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be
suspended unless when, in the case of rebellion or invasion, the
public safety may require it.3
1I KENTruczY lEvisE STATUTES [hereinafter KRS] § 435.010 (1962).
2 This has been construed to mean the proof of guilt is evident or the pre-
sumption of guilt is great. Day v. Caudill, 300 S.W.2d 45, 46 (Ky. 1957); Com-
monwealth v. Stahl, 237 Ky. 388, 35 S.W.2d 563 (1931).
a KENTrucKy CoNsTrrrUrON § 16. This mandate has been recognized by the
Court of Appeals in many cases including Smiddy v. Barlow, 288 S.W.2d 346
(Continued on next page)
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